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Health Care:

Why Jurisdiction Matters
By Kevin C. Walsh

C

ongress’s enactment of comprehensive
healthcare reform legislation last year was
the culmination of one round of an intense
debate that continues today. The second
round began the same day that the first round ended,
when President Obama signed the legislation. In this
second round, the locus of debate has shifted from
Congress to the courts, which are processing a slew of
lawsuits filed immediately after enactment.
One of the most prominent is Virginia v. Sebelius.
The lawsuit presents on its face a prominent and critically important question of federalism: Did Congress
exceed the limits of its enumerated legislative powers
by enacting the individual mandate, which requires
individuals to have insurance or pay a penalty for
failing to have it? But the lawsuit also presents a less
recognized but equally important question of separation of powers: Is the federal judiciary authorized to
rule on Virginia’s claim that the individual mandate is
unconstitutional?
Virginia seeks to vindicate the Health Care Freedom
Act, a state statute declaring that no Virginia resident shall be required to obtain or maintain
health insurance. To defend this state law
from the preemptive effect of federal
law, Virginia contends that the federal
legislation’s

individual mandate to obtain and maintain health insurance is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has held,
however, that a state cannot go to federal court simply
to seek a declaratory judgment that its state law is not
preempted by federal law—precisely the relief sought
in Virginia v. Sebelius. The upshot is that, in seeking to
enforce limits on federal legislative powers, Virginia’s
lawsuit runs afoul of limits on the federal judicial power.
The federal government did not identify this
particular jurisdictional flaw in its filings in the district
court, although the federal government did move to
dismiss on other jurisdictional grounds. The district
court denied that motion to dismiss and ruled in
Virginia’s favor on the merits of its constitutional challenge. The jurisdictional and merits rulings are currently being reviewed on appeal.
Even if Virginia’s case is jurisdictionally defective,
the federal courts will be able to decide the constitutionality of the individual mandate in other cases. In
fact, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has paired Virginia
v. Sebelius for back-toback argument
with another
constitutional
challenge to

the individual mandate that is not subject to the same
jurisdictional objections as Virginia’s. One might ask,
then, why the federal courts should bother to spend time
on jurisdictional technicalities in Virginia’s case.
The reason is that form matters in constitutional
adjudication. The United States does not have a system
in which the federal courts function as a free-floating
council of revision. Constitutional adjudication is—
and ought to remain—incidental to the resolution of a
justiciable case or controversy.
Alexis de Tocqueville, astute observer of American
legal culture that he was, explained early in this nation’s
history why it is essential to adhere strictly to casecentered constitutional adjudication. “If the judge had
been empowered to contest the law on the ground of
theoretical generalities,” Tocqueville wrote, “if he were
able to take the initiative and to censure the legislator, he would play a prominent political part; and as
the champion or antagonist of a party, he would have
brought the hostile passions of the nation into the
conflict.” This peril of politicization is minimized
by insisting on incidental adjudication of constitutional issues—that is, constitutional adjudication that
takes place only as incidental to resolution of a case
or controversy. This feature of federal jurisdiction,
Tocqueville recognized, ensures that “the American
judge is brought into the political arena independently
of his own will. He judges the law only because he is
obliged to judge a case.”
Virginia v. Sebelius is not a case that the federal courts
are authorized, let alone obliged,
to decide. Virginia has
conceded that it cannot sue the federal
government as
parens patriae,
that is, in a

representative capacity to protect its citizens from federal
law. Virginia also has conceded that, in the absence of
the Health Care Freedom Act, its constitutional claim
against the mandate would be too abstract to constitute
a justiciable controversy in federal court.
Virginia argues that the Health Care Freedom Act
makes all the difference; it transforms a dispute that
would otherwise be abstract and non-justiciable into
one that is concrete and ripe for resolution. But the
conflict between state and federal law remains abstract.
The single provision of federal law that Virginia
asserts to be outside Congress’s constitutional authority
imposes no obligation on Virginia itself—only on its
residents. And the rights of no particular individual are
asserted to be at issue in Virginia’s lawsuit.
If Virginia can generate a justiciable controversy
where one would not otherwise exist, by first passing a
law and then seeking a declaratory judgment about that
law’s validity, then so too can any other state. This jurisdictional two-step would provide entrée to a prominent
platform for elected state officials to seek judicial validation of their constitutional visions apart from a concrete
controversy, which would have significant political
consequences. The practical effect would be to eliminate the insulation provided by the case-or-controversy
requirement whenever a controversial issue mobilizes a
state legislature to enact an anti-federal-law state law. Yet
that is precisely when such insulation is most needed.
There is nothing wrong with filing a lawsuit to
enforce limits on federal legislative power. But such
lawsuits must fit within the limited jurisdiction granted
to the federal courts by Congress and the United States
Constitution. Even if Virginia is correct that
Congress has exceeded its limited authority,
that provides no reason to invite a federal court to do the same. n
Kevin C. Walsh is an assistant professor of law whose
scholarship explores the doctrines that define—and
delimit—the scope of federal judicial power. This essay
was adapted from his forthcoming publication,
The Ghost that Slew the Mandate, 64
Stanford L. Rev. This issue went to
print shortly before the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit heard oral argument in Virginia v.
Sebelius.
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